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ABSTRACT
Public participation effect and public welfare as a mediation forest management was conducted in forest
conservation in the Baluran National Park, East Java, Indonesia. The problem faced that buffer villages
Wonorejo, Watu Kebo, Bajul Mati, Sumber Waru and Sumber Anyar always exploit the forest product for
their economic reasons. The purposes of this research are to: (1) analyze and explain incentive participation
program has a positive significant effect on public participation; (2) analyze and explain social capital has
a positive significant effect on public participation; (3) analyze and explain public welfare mediates incentive
participation program effect on public participation; (4) analyze and explain public welfare mediates social
capital’s effect on public participation; and (5) analyze and explain public welfare has a positive significant
effect to optimize public participation. The survey method and questioner by purposive sampling with 170
households as a member or group of the forest community training centre in the buffer villages. Validity
and reliability of instrument and examine hypothesis using software Warp PLS. The results shows: (1)
incentive participation program has a positive significant effect on public participation; (2) social capital
does not have a positive significant effect on public participation; (3) public welfare mediates incentive
participation program on public participation partially; (4) public welfare mediates social capital’s effect on
public participation partially; and (5) public welfare has positive significant effect on public participation
to optimize public participation in conservation forest management. Practical implications of this research
are able to give knowledge and information of local government and people to consider the importance of
public participation in conservation forest management in the Baluran National Park.
Key words : Incentive, Social Capital, Public welfare, Public participation, Conservation forest management
Introduction
A national park, as a forest conservation area, has a
variety of flora and fauna which can be relied upon
to ensure the human survival for now and future
(PHKA, 2008). The majority of these parks have now
faced threats and interferences such as encroach-
ment, and illegal cultivation continues to increase
over time (Tahajuddin, 2015). Threats and distur-
bances in these areas are caused by various factors,
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namely (a) the institutions role in forest conservation
management and local population participation
level of the are still not optimum (especially in the
case of those living around the forest); (b) the lack
awareness about the conservation area is still very
low among local people; (c) the education level of
local people is low; and (d) there is a lack of agricul-
tural land (Muntasib, 1999; PHKA, 2008).
Public participation in forestry management pro-
gram is very important. The assumption is the rural
communities are part of the problem in the forestry
management. Because they are trying to meet the
needs from the forest resources, as well as by involv-
ing local people in forest management is part of the
solution (Robert Fisher, 2007).
During the period 2000-2005, the forest converted
both planned and unplanned, reached up to
1.089.560 million ha with a total area of deforesta-
tion was estimated 21% (Kartodihardjo, 2013). Indo-
nesia as a tropical forest and as the third richest
biodiversity in the world after Brazil and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo with a total area reached
130.68 million ha, but as many as 72% have been
lost. Forest damage also occurred in the community
forest, which about 10 km from the edge of the for-
est area (Adi Nugroho, 2008; Tahajuddin, 2015). The
destruction of forests was 3.8 million ha/year, or a
mean of 7.2 ha per minute. Forest destruction has
effects such as landslides, droughts, floods, global
warming and ozone layer destruction and the ex-
tinction of flora and fauna richness.
Based on Baluran (2014a) to anticipate any prob-
lems, then should change vision and mission in-
cludes: (1) managing wildlife and habitats effec-
tively, efficiently, and sustainably in order to restore
wildlife and habitat, such as the conditions of the
early 1960s;  (2) managing ecotourism through
ecotourism and special interest to increase tourist
visits and state revenue.
The problems faced by Baluran National Park
(BNP) are problems with buffer villages of
Wonorejo, Watu Kebo, Bajul Mati, Sumber Waru
and Sumber Anyar. To reduce the problems, then
the management of Baluran National Park in col-
laboration with community leaders to form a group
or a community organization such as farmer groups,
forest village community institutions, cultivators
agricultural land, group of tourism and travel ser-
vices, forest community training centre in order to
join and participate in the forest management.
The forest destruction in Baluran National Park
includes: (i) forest fires in 2014, with 132 fires cover-
ing an area of around 2.005,90 ha. Rather than natu-
ral factors, the main causes of forest fires are local
people not acting responsibly, a lack of security per-
sonnel guarding the forest, and weak law enforce-
ment. Forest fires impact heavily on the flora and
fauna. (ii) Clearing activities as a result of 400 ha
being devoted to agricultural plants business. (iii)
Timber theft (as well as theft of firewood, fruit tart,
hazelnut, gebang trees, ornamental fish and over
grassing) especially in the Labuhan Merak resort.
(iv) Cattle grazing is a problem that is quite promi-
nent, especially in the areas of Karangtekok,
Labuhan Merak, and Balanan with about 3.450 ha.
Cattle grazing (cows and goats) is widespread, with
an average of 1.447 head of cattle per day. As a re-
sult of this illegal grazing, the soil becomes solid,
which is harmful to plants and vegetation that could
potentially be survival disruption of the park, as
well as deer, antelope, and bison (the unique wild-
life of Baluran National Park). (v) Local transmigra-
tion settlements since 1976, covering an area of 57 ha
in Pandean area of Wonorejo village. (vi) Illegal en-
croachment and the tilling of the soil. (vii) Hunting
of wildlife by people with firearms, snares, poison,
and sap that often occurs during the dry season.
Various factors affect the behavior and movement
patterns of animals, including a limited source of
drinking water for animals, especially in the dry sea-
son. Based on the above phenomena, this paper fo-
cuses on the damaged forest in the Baluran National
Park, caused by the poor level of public participa-
tion ( (Baluran, 1997, 2014b; Sabarno, 2001; Syafi’i,
2013).
Based on the above phenomenon, this paper fo-
cuses about a damaged forest in the Baluran Na-
tional Park, caused by the poorness of public partici-
pation. Forest management efforts based on public
participation in the Baluran National Park as the
urgency of the forestry development and the devel-
opment of rural communities.
There are some previous studies which discuss
public participation in the forestry management
program. These include: (1) the effects of incentive
participation program for social forestry manage-
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ment in increasing public participation by Adhikari
(2014); Djamhuri (2012); Kaseya (2016); (2) incentive
participation program effects in relation to welfare
by D. B. Rahut (2015); William (2013); Das (2010); (3)
the social capital effects on public participation by
Sara (2011); Sharpe (2012); (4) social capital effect on
public welfare by Grootaet (1999); Narayan (1997);
and (5) how welfare effect on public participation in
development programs as done by D. B. Rahut
(2015) (2015); and Akamani (2015).
The issue of differences in measurement of incen-
tive participation program is the first gap in this re-
search. Adhikari (2014) measured incentive partici-
pation program with six indicators, they are: (1) ac-
cess to forests and availability of forest products, (2)
financial support to supplement household income,
(3) social security and cohesion through local insti-
tution building, (4) investment in local community
infrastructure and development, (5) well-dened &
enforced property rights over forest resources as-
signed to the users, and (6) payment for environ-
mental services. The research’s purposes of
Adhikari (2014) are: (1) to determine the relation-
ships between different incentive participation pro-
gram and the level of public participation of user
group members; (2) to explore how households
might respond to any changes in the incentive par-
ticipation program, in terms of their decision to par-
ticipate in common property resource governance;
and (3) to propose/recommend how organizational
incentive participation program can be better inte-
grated in order to induce more effective public par-
ticipation of users in the governance and manage-
ment of property resources. The indicators of public
participation were measured based on (1) member-
ship length; (2) representation on the executive com-
mittee; (3) level of public participation in meetings,
(4) in decision-making, and (5) in implementation;
and (6) overall benefits.
While Djamhuri (2012) measured incentive par-
ticipation program with seven indicators, they are:
(1) Forest village population); (2) villages forests/
WPH; (3) Number of forest village community
(LMDH) trustee board members; (4) Percentage of
Tumpang Sari Farmers on the LMDH trustee board;
(5) Tree coverage on foundation of the LMDH; (6)
Current tree coverage; (7) Trustee board members
attendance of routine meetings. The indicative num-
bers of LMDH trustee board members and percent-
age of Tumpang Sari Farmers on LMDH trustee
board consist of: (a) formal education; (2) household
annual income; (3) use of feed/fodder from state
forest land; and (4) use of firewood from forest
land.. Djamhuri (2012) said Tumpang Sari is an in-
centive participation program which is traditional in
forest management.  Government and society inte-
gration provides a better incentive participation pro-
gram in the hope that the public will be will contrib-
ute in the state forest management.
Kaseya (2016) measured incentive participation
program with three indicators, they are: (1) civic
education, (2) financial incentives both transport
and lunch allowances, and (3) scheduling of fo-
rums/meetings. The study result was corroborated
by the findings from the open interview which indi-
cated that 62.5 percent of the respondents concurred
that financial incentives are offered to participants.
Measurements of incentive participation program in
this research refers to Adhikari (2014); Djamhuri
(2012); and Kaseya (2016), but its indicators are
based on research object conditions.
The second gap of this research is the differences
of social capital’s measurements done by Grootaet
(1999); and Narayan (1997). Grootaet (1999) mea-
sured social capital into six dimension of social capi-
tal, they are: (1) density of membership, (2) hetero-
geneity index, (3) meeting attendance, (4) decision
making index, (5) membership dues, and (6) com-
munity orientation. Narayan (1997) measured social
capital into six variables, they are: (1) heterogeneity
members, (2) inclusiveness members, dan (3) perfor-
mances members.  Social capital’s indicators consist
of: (1) membership, (2) characteristic of membership;
(3) values and individual’s behaviours.   Measure-
ment of social capital in this study refers to Grootaet
(1999); and Narayan (1997), who measures social
capital as a factor in the reduction of poverty and
increase in prosperity, but indicators of social capi-
tal of this research based on research object condi-
tion. Welfare provision would increase the role of
public participation in development. Increased pub-
lic participation will reduce transaction costs and the
cost of control, raise output and further improve the
welfare of the community. D. B. Rahut (2015) sug-
gested increasing public participation in collabora-
tive forest management (CFM) while adding wel-
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fare as a mediation variable which will affect social
capital and also affect public participation.
The novelty of research are: (1) to examine the
integrative model with purposes to insure wether
incentive participation program, social capital and
public welfare still have positive significant effect on
public participation; (2) to analyze the level of pub-
lic participation based on participation in planning
program, implementation, benefit-sharing; and
evaluation and monitoring of the forest conservation
management in Baluran National Park. After all, the
purposes of this study that were presented here will
be to analyze and explain: (1)  the effect of incentive
participation programs on public participation; (2)
how welfare mediates the effects of incentive partici-
pation programs on public participation; (3) social
capital’s effect on public participation; (4) how wel-
fare mediates social capital’s effect on public partici-
pation; and (5) welfare’s effect on public participa-
tion.
This study take place in forest conservation in the
Baluran National Park, Situbondo-East Java-
Indonesai. According to Baluran (2014a) the man-
agement system in Baluran National Park separated
by three zones. Based on director general of forest
conservation and nature, number SK.228/IV- SET/
2012  and the date in December, 26, 2012 stated that
some zones in Baluran National Park are (1) Core
zone around 6,920.18 ha (red coloured); (2) Jungle
zone around 12,604.14 ha (yellow coloured); (3)
Advantages zone around 1,856.51 ha (light blue
coloured); (4) Traditional zone around 1,349,21 ha
(green coloured); (5) Special zone around 738.19 ha
(dark blue coloured); (6) Marine protection zone
around 1,174.96 ha (blue coloured); and also (7) Re-
habilitation zone around 365. 81 ha (brown
coloured).
Literature Review
Krajewski (1999) in his book of “Operations Man-
agement Strategy and Analysis”, based on
workforce management strategy concept, he said
the human resources is an important issue as a tech-
nology process. The capabilities of managers and
employee and how they be organized, trained, and
motivated, can give competitive advanteges of an
organization. Restructuring organization done
which purposes to improve the organization for
customer’s satisfaction (Krajewski, 1999).
Cohen (1997) and Adhikari (2014) even said that
an important concept in economics is not money,
but rather to incentive participation program. The
incentive something that motivates people to do the
choices in decision making. Incentive participation
program do not have to be money, but it can be also
a social award. The right incentive participation pro-
gram not only in money but also increase social sta-
tus and dignity of individuals who receive it will
cause social interaction in both communities and
organizations have been more helpful. Based on the
formulation of the problem, research objectives, de-
scriptions of theoretical and empirical and concep-
tual framework above, it can put forward the hy-
pothesis that a temporary answer will still be verifi-
able.
Materials and Method
Data were collected during July-December 2017
through interview, research questionnaires, and
documentation. Interview was conducted to deter-
mine the respondents’ answers to a questionnaire
relating to the variables that have been used in this
study.
The sampling method is purposive sampling and
unit analysis is of heads-of-household who are
members of the forestry community training center,
170 respondents in total.  The construct validity of
reflective indicators were tested based on conver-
gent validity, discriminant validity, composite reli-
ability (Kock, 2015). Variable with formative indica-
tors were tested based on the values of full collinear-
ity variances inflations factor.
The method of data analysis used in this study is
structural equation modeling using WarpPLS 5.0.
Accoring to Solimun (2010), if the structural modelFig. 1. Zoning of  Baluran National Park
SISWANTO ET AL 1841
consist of recursive and the latent variables have
formative, and reflective or mixed, so the best analy-
sis approach is Structural Equation Modelling (SEM)
WarpPLS (SEM PLS). This study used a quantitative
approach (positivist or mainstream) this research is
working with numbers, the data is a tangible, ana-
lyzed using statistics to test hypotheses or answer
specific research questions and to make predictions
that a particular variable affects other variables
(Creswell, 2003 ).
To test mediation roles the causal-step approach
of Baron and Kenny was used. The best way to test
for mediation effects is by counting the VAF value
(Variance Accounted For), which can determine the
indirect effect relative to the total effect (Hair, 2014).
According to Baron ( 1986) the causal step ap-
proach has four mediation effects they are: Non
mediation, if VAF value <20%; Partial mediation, if
VAF value is around 20% ≤ 80%; Full mediation, if
VAF value > 80%; Suppressed mediation, if the di-
rect effect sign changed after inclusion of the media-
tion variable.
Research Hypothesis
Based on the literature review above it can be de-
scribed the conceptual framework oh the study as a
basis for the hypothesis formulations are as follows:
H1: Incentive participation program has a positive
significant effect on public participation.
H2: Social capital has a positive significant effect on
public participation.
H3: Public welfare mediates incentive participation
program effect on public participation
H4: Public welfare mediates social capital’s effect
on public participation
H5: Public welfare has a positive significant effect
on public participation.
ISN is a latent variable of incentive participation
program with four reflective indicators of X11: Incen-
tive of training, X12: Incentive of agricultural tools,
X13: incentive of cash payement, and X14: Incentive
agricultural land use.
MDS is a latent variable of social capital with five
reflective indicators of X21: helping each other, X22:
social norm, X23: network interaction, X24: trust level,
X25: group’s help.
KSJ is a latent variable of public welfare with four
formative indicators of X31: household’s income; X32:
household’s education, X33: household’s health, X34:
supporting facilities.
PAR is a latent variable of public participation
with four reflective indicators of Y11: Public partici-
pation at the meeting; Y12: Public participation in
decision making, Y13: Public participation in imple-




Descriptive analysis of variables aims to interpret
each variable based on the frequency distribution
and the average score of respondents was catego-
rized into five categories using a Likert scale.
According to Adhikari et al. (2014) incentive pub-
lic participation defined as those mechanisms that
positively effect on an individual’s attitude and be-
havior, which then motivates their active public par-
ticipation in collective arrangements for improved
governance and management of their forest re-
sources.
Incentive participation program variable consist
of four indicators (Incentive of training, Incentive of
agricultural tools, incentive of cash payement, and
incentive agricultural land use) are categorized as
not good conditions (3.81<4.00). The highest loading
is the incentive participation program of agriculture
tools (0.971), mean score (3.97), but it is still reflected
not good condition (<4.00). The lowest mean score is
the incentive participation program of training (3.67)
is reflected as not good condition and effects theFig. 2. Research Hypothesis Model
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level of public participation, especially in develop-
ing the quality of human resources. The lowest
mean score (incentive participation program of
training ) impacts on the negative word of mouth /
NWOM (Richins, 1984). Based on the research of
Richins (1984), people who fell unsatisfaction about
the incentive participation program of training, then
he/she will tell to every other thirteen people. This
can be reduced the level of public participation in
forest conservation management in BNP.
The social capital variable is consist of five indica-
tors (reciprocity, social norms, network interaction,
level of trust in the community group, and buffer
villages group donations) are categorized as not
good conditions (3.93<4.00).  The highest loading
factor is social norms (0.738) and means score is
(4.21) is reflected as good condition. But the lowest
mean score is buffer village group’s donation (3.64)
is reflected as not good condition and effects the
level of public participation. The lowest mean score
is buffer village group’s donation also impact on the
negative word of mouth /NWOM (Richins, 1984).
Welfare variable is consist of five indicators
(household income, household education, house-
hold health, and household supporting facilities) are
categorized as not good condition (3.81<4.00). The
highest loading factor is household’s income (0.664)
and mean score (3.86) is reflected as not good condi-
tion and effects the level of public participation
(<4.00). The lowest mean score is supporting facili-
ties (3.73) is reflected as not good condition and ef-
fects the level of public participation. The lowest
mean score is supporting facilities also impact on the
negative word of mouth /NWOM (Richins, 1984).
Public participation variable is consist of four in-
dicators (participation in planning program, partici-
pation in implementation, participation in benefit-
sharing, and participation in monitoring and evalu-
ation) are categorized as not good condition with
average score is 3.85 or less than 4.00. The highest
loading factor is participation in implementation
(0.804) and mean score (3.85) is reflected as not good
condition. The lowest mean score is participation in
planning program (3.68) is reflected as not good
condition and effects the level of public participa-
tion. The lowest mean score is participation in plan-
ning program, also impact on the negative word of
mouth /NWOM (Richins, 1984).
Convergent and Discriminat Validity
Convergent Validity
Convergent validity testing is performed to identify
the items of instrument indicators as indicators from
a latent variable. The convergent validity test result
based on all of the outer loading values are more
than 0.6 (>0.6). Therefore, it can be concluded that
this research has met the requirements of the con-
vergent validity
Incentive participation program with its indica-
tors  X11 =0.706, X12 =0.971; X13 =0.960, and X14=0.966,
are more than 0.30 ( > 0,30)  meets convergent valid-
ity. Social capital with its indicators  X21 =0.701, X22
= 0.738, X23 = 0.827, X24 = 0.823, X25 = 0.56, are more
than 0.30 (>0.30) meets convergent validity. Public
welfare with its indicators X31=0.664, X32 =0.576, X33
=0.848, and X34 =0.800, are  >0.30 meets convergent
validity. Public participation with its indicators Y11
=0.722, Y12=0.876, Y13 = 0.804, Y14= 0.527, are >0.30
meets convergent validity.
Discriminant Validity
A discriminant validity test was performed after
those for convergent validity. It is to identify the
validity of instrument items in a model (Solimun,
2017). The result of the discriminant construct valid-
ity test of the square roots of AVE are higher than
the variable correlation score, then the variable
meets the criteria of discriminant validity.
Discriminant validity from each indicator of this
research are (a) Incentive participation program
with its indicators X11 with loading factor is 0.669
and cross loading are 0.355, -0.124,0.183, because
loading factor > cross loading meets discriminant
validity. X12=0.971 with -0.080, 0.036, and -0.024, also
meets discriminant validity. X13 =0.960 with -0.098,
0.013, and -0.045 meets discriminant validity. X14
=0.966 with -0.069, 0.036, and -0.058 meets discrimi-
nant validity.
Social capital with its indicators:  X21 = 0.701 and
cross loading are -0.128, 0.255, and -0.125. X22= 0.737
with -0.237, 0.322, and -0.114. X23= 0.827 with 0.100,
-0.164, and 0.128. X24= 0.823 with 0.107, -0.174, and
0.140. X25 = 0.566 with 0.165, -0.242, and -0.087 also
meet discriminant validity because loading factor >
cross loading.
Public welfare with its indicators X31=0.663 with
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cross loading 0.298, -0.313, and -0.042. X32=-0.575
with 0.201, -0.041, and -0.220. X33=-0.849 with  -0.121,
0.098, and -0.008. X34=-0.800 with -0.263, 0.184, and
0.202 also meet discriminant validity.
Public participation with its indicators Y11=0.778
with the cross loading 0.247, 0.654, and -0.239. Y12=-
0.714 with -0.501, -0.214, and 0.359. Y13=0.818 with -
0.022, -0.280, and -0.147. Y14=0.827 with 0.573, 0.355,
-0.124 meets discriminant validity.
If the square roots  AVE more than variable cor-
relation, so that the variable meets discriminant va-
lidity. ISN with its indicators has square roots  AVE
0.888 with variable correlation 0.525, 0.515, and
0.444 meets discriminant validity. MDS has square
roots AVE 0.737 with variable correlation 0.370,
0.250, and 0.388. KSJ has square roots AVE 0.730
with variable correlation 0.459, 0.250, and 0.037.
PAR has square roots AVE 0.621 with variable cor-




The composite reliability coefficients values in this
research are more than 0.70 ( > 0.70) so all variables
meet reliability. Variable of ISN (incentive participa-
tion program) is 0.944, MDS (social capital) is 0.784,
KSJ (public  welfare) is 0.817, and PAR (public par-
ticipation) is 0.858.
Consistency Internal Reliability
The consistency internal reliability values in this
study also more 0.60 (> 0.60), so called consistency
internal are reliable. These reasons can be found
from Cronbach alpha values that ISN (incentive par-
ticipation program) is 0.916, MDS (social capital) is
0.760, KSJ (public welfare) is 0.701; and PAR (public
participation) is 0.732.
Model fit and quality indices
Model fit can be found based on the p-value for
APC and ARS must be smaller from 0.05 or means
significant. Beside that, AVIF as a multycolinierity
must be smaller also from  5. The output shows the
goodness of fit criteria with (APC)=0.276,
P<0.001and (ARS)=0.282, P<0.001  and also signifi-
cant. The AVIF value is 1.350 also have met fit crite-
ria. The p-value for APC and ARS must be smaller
from 0.05 or means significant. Beside that, AVIF as
a multycolinierity must be smaller also from  5. The
output shows the goodness of fit criteria with
(APC)=0.276, P<0.001and (ARS)=0.282, P<0.001
and also significant. The AVIF value is 1.350 also
have met fit criteria.
Profil of Variable with Indicators
The highest loading factor  of incentive  is X12 with
score 0.971 and average score 0.502, the highest
loading factor of social capital is X23=0.827 and av-
erage score 0.270, the highest loading factor of pub-
lic welfare is X33=-0.849 and average score 0.502,
and for public participation variable the highest
loading factor is Y14=0.827 and average is 0.470.
Path coefficients and P values
All the path coefficients predictor variable effect to
respond variable effect positive and significant. ISN
(incentive participation program) to PAR (public
participation) with coefficient value 0.269 and p
value 0.001 is significant positive.
ISN to KSJ (public welfare) with coefficient value
0.363 and p value <0.001 significant positive. MDS
(social capital) to PAR with coefficient value 0.308
and p value <0.001 significant positive.
MDS to KSJ with coefficient value 0.343 and p
value is <0.001 significant positive. KSJ to PAR with
coefficient value -0.096 with p value 0.14 is not sig-
nificant, because p-value is more than 0.5.
Output Laten Variable Coefficients
R-squared shows some percentage of respond vari-
able can be distinguished by predictor variable. R-
squared with higher value so the model is better, but
R-squared only can be used for response variable.
Based on the results R-squared for public partici-
pation (PAR) variable is 0.670 that means contribu-
tions of variable effect incentive participation pro-
Table 1. Correlations among l.vs. with sq. rts. of AVEs
Correlations among l.vs. with sq. rts. of AVEs
ISN MDS KSJ PAR
ISN 0.888 0.525 0.515 0.444
MDS 0.370 0.737 0.250 0.388
KSJ 0.459 0.250 0.730 0.037
PAR 0.380 0.388 0.037 0.621
Source: Data analysis Warp PLS, 2017
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gram, social capital (MDS), and welfare (KSJ) on
public participation (PAR) is 67 %  and the rest in 32
% by another variable outside the research model
and error.
Composite reliability value and Cronbach alpha
can be used to know research instruments. Based on
the above output, the composite reliability >0.70 and
Cronbach alpha > 0.60 for all variables. Then all
variables in this research have met the reliability cri-
teria.
The Average Variances Extracted (AVE) is used
to evaluate the discriminant validity, with criteria
must be > 0.50. Based on the above output that AVE
values are : (1) incentive participation program vari-
able is 0.791; (2) social capital variable is 0.542; (3)
welfare variable is 0.531; and (4) participation vari-
able is 0.647. All the variable met the AVE value cri-
teria >0.50 and meet the discriminant validity.
Full collinearity VIF is a complete collinearity test
result consist of vertical and lateral multicollinearity.
Lateral collinearity is a collinearity between a pre-
dictor latent variable with criteria and can be used to
test the common method bias.
The criteria full collinearity test value must be
<3.3. This research has met full collinearity criteria
with < 3.3, they are  2.151 for ISN, 1.034 for MDS,
3.230 for KSJ, and 2.678 for PAR.
Q-squared used for predictive test or the relation
from all of the predictor latent variable on criterion
variable. The Q-squared result can be negative, but
R-squared result must be positive.
The estimation result of this output above shows
good predictive variable with 0.555, and 0.666 value
are more than zero.
Path coefficients and P values
Based on table 4, can be explained that all the path
coefficients predictor variable effect to respond vari-
able effect positive and significant. ISN (incentive
participation program) to PAR (public participation)
with coefficient value 0.153 and  p value 0.042 is
positive significant. ISN to KSJ (public welfare) with
coefficient value 0.680 and p value <0.001 positive
significant. MDS (social capital) to PAR with coeffi-
cient value 0.120 and p value 0.089 not positive sig-
nificant. MDS to KSJ with coefficient value 0.187 and
p value is <0.017 positive significant. KSJ to PAR
with coefficient value 0.648 with p value <0.001 is
positive significant.
Output Correlations Among Latent  Variables
Output Correlations among latent variables is a cor-
relation coefficient among variables with the p-
value. The output is very important to evaluate dis-
criminant validity of the research instrument. The
criteria used is square roots of average variance ex-
tracted (AVE) that is diagonal column value and
given bracket sign must be higher than a correlation
of all latent variables at same column. The discrimi-
nant variable for ISN already fulfilled the square
roots of AVE is 0.901, more than 0.370, 0.459, and
0.380. Validity for MDS also meet the square roots of
AVE is 0.737 also >0.370, 0.250, and 0.388. Variable
KSJ also fulfills the validity requirements because
the square of roots AVE is  0.730 >0.459, 0.250, and
0.037. Variable PAR also meets the validity square
roots AVE is 0.621 > 0.099, 0120, and -0.166.
Table 2. Output Latent Variable Coefficients
ISN MDS KSJ PAR
R-squared 0.427 0.670
Adj. R-squared 0.418 0.662
Composite reliability 0.868 0.874 0.857 0.849
Cronbach’s alpha 0.827 0.849 0.813 0.795
Avg. Var. Extrac 0.791 0.542 0.531 0.647
Full collin. VIF 2.151 1.034 3.230 2.678
Q-squared 0.555 0.666
Source: Out latent Variable Coefficients Warp PLS, 2017
Table 3. Output Path Coefficients
Path coefficients




PAR 0.153 0.120 0.648
p-values




PAR 0.042 0.089 <0.001
Source: Output Path Coefficients Warp PLS, 2017
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Hypothesis Results Using WarpPLS
Direct Hypotesis
H1: Incentive participation program has a posi-
tive significant effect on public participation.
Incentive participation program effect on public
participation with path coefficient score 0.153, and
p-value 0.042. Because p-value is less than 0.05
(0.042< 0.05, so it is called significant and this hy-
pothesis is received. The results support the theory
of incentive from Robbins (2007); Luthan (2006); and
Adhikari et al. (2014). This research also empirically
support research from Adhikari (2014), and
Djamhuri (2012).
H2: Social capital has a positive significant effect
on public participation.
Social capital (MDS) effect on public Participation
with path coefficient score 0.120, and p-value 0.089.
Because p-value is more than 0.05 (0.089 > 0.05, so it
is also called not significant and this hypothesis is
not received. The test results does not support the
theory of social capital (Woolcock, 1998), as well as
not supporting empirical research of  Zare Sara
(2011), and Dag Wollebæk and Per Selle (2003).
Mediation Hypothesis
Based on figure 3, all of the indirect effects are sig-
nificant/positive because p-values are less than 0.05.
The third step is to test mediation effect by using the
VAF formula. The formula of VAF= (p12 * p 23)/
(p12. * p23 + p13). The results of the mediation test
using the VAF method are as follows:
H3: Public welfare mediates incentive partici-
pation program effect on public participation.
Incentive participation program on public participa-
tion by the mediation of welfare is positive signifi-
cant, with p-value <0.001, less than 0.05..
VAF= (0.680 X 0.648)/ (0.680 X 0.648) + (0.153)
VAF= (0.440)/ (0.440 + 0.153)
VAF= 0.440 / 0.593
VAF= 0.741
VAF= 74,1%. This means that welfare mediates
incentive participation program on public participa-
tion as a partial mediation. Welfare mediates incen-
tive effect (74,1%) on public participation.
Public welfare (KSJ) effect in mediating incentive
participation program (ISN) on public participation
(PAR) with path coefficient score 0.363 and p-value
<0.001, less than 0.05, so it is called that public wel-
fare mediates incentive participation program effect
on public participation is significant. The test results
support of empirical research from Rahut et al.,
(2015); William  M. Fonta et al., (2009); Nimai Das &
Debnarayan Sarker (2010).
H4: Public welfare mediates social capital effect
on public participation.
Social capital’s effect on public participation by
the mediation of welfare is positive significant with
p-value 0.023, less than 0.05.
VAF= (0.187 X 0.648)/ (0.187 X 0.648) + (0.120)
VAF= (0.121) / (0.121+ 0.120)
VAF= (0.121) / (0.241)
VAF= 0.502
VAF= 50.2%.  This means welfare mediates social
capital’s effect on public participation as a partial
mediation. Welfare mediates social capital’s effect
(50.2%) on public participation.
Public welfare (KSJ) effect in mediating social
capital effect on public participation with path coef-
ficient score 0.343 and p-value=<0.001 also less than
0.05, it is called that public welfare effect in mediat-
ing social capital effect on public participation is
positive and significant. The results support the
theory of social capital Grootaert (1999). Further
Source: Output Path Coefficients Warp PLS, 2017
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Fukuyama (2000) argues that there is a close rela-
tionship between social capital with the level of pub-
lic welfare of a community or nation. The results
also support the empirical study of Grootaet (1999);
Narayan dan Pritchett (1997); Chan, Raymond et.al
(2002): Yusuf, S.A. (2008).
H5: Public welfare has a positive significant effect
to optimize public participation.
Public welfare (KSJ) to PAR with coefficient score is
0.648, and p-value <0.001.  The coefficient score is
positive and p-value is less than 0.05, so KSJ (public
welfare) has positive significant effect on public par-
ticipation for optimizing people to participate in for-
est management in the Baluran National Park. And
also if people receive more incentive and able to in-
crease their welfare they will more participate in
forest management in the Baluran National Park as
well.  The test results support of empirically re-
search from Rahut (2015); and Akamani (2015).
Conclusions
Based on the results of discussions and research
findings, several conclusions can be stated as fol-
lows:
1. Incentive participation program has positive
significant effect on public participation in
managing the forest conservation in the
Baluran National Park.
2. Public welfare mediates incentive participation
program’s effect on public participation as a
partial mediation.
3. The social capital dos not have  positive effect
on public participation in managing the forest
conservation in the Baluran National Park.
4. Public welfare mediates social capital’s effect
on public participation as a partial mediation.
5. Public welfare has a  positive significant effect
on public participation in managing the forest
conservation in the Baluran National Park.
This because the public welfare is a key success
in managing forest conservation in the Baluran
National Park.
Policy Recommendations
Based on the findings of this study, may put for-
ward suggestions into recommendations as follows:
Strategies should be taken by  manager to man-
age the forest conservation in the Baluran National
Park, that can give benefit to improve public welfare
are: (1) improving the forest institution role to in-
volve public particaption of a team/member
(Krajewski, 1999). Involving a team/member  of the
forest community training centre, is one of a strategy
to increase public participation in managing the for-
est conservation in the Bauran National Park
(Krajewski, 1999), (2) increasing the public participa-
tion by giving incentive of training and knowledge
of forest conservation, (3) increasing the buffer vil-
lage group’s donation for member or group of the
forest community training centre in the buffer vil-
lages, (4) giving and help the supporting family fa-
cilities to improve the productivity and public wel-
fare of the forest community training centre mem-
ber, (5) the role of forest institution should increase
the public participation of the forest community
training centre member (participation in planning
program,  participation in implementation, partici-
pation in benefit-sharing, and participation in moni-
toring and evaluation) in managing forest conserva-
tion program, (6) utilizing the management policy
that is transparent and accountable to maximize
conservation efforts, including the implementation
of sustainable tourism, (7) take advantage of global
support and the communication efficiency of coordi-
nation to improve the competitiveness of the
ecotourism, (8) develop the design for the optimiza-
tion of natural resources for the public welfare of the
surrounding community, (9) the optimization of
biodiversity conservation, community empower-
ment, resources of tourist attractions, and mobiliz-
ing global support for the restoration of degraded
areas.
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